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Abstract 
 This Article highlights the tension between marijuana legalization 
efforts, on the one hand, and the continued criminalization of marijuana 
at the federal level on the other. I argue that the uncertain preemptive 
effect of federal law on more liberal state laws poses a threat to other 
states’ experimentation with recreational or compassionate use regimes. 
I further argue that constitutional doctrines, like the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine, which are intended to preserve political 
union by interrupting cycles of discrimination and retaliation, could, 
ironically, hamper state efforts to minimize spillover effects resulting 
from legalization of marijuana. The Article concludes with suggestions 
how Congress could play a positive role, as it did during the national 
debate over alcohol policy that preceded Prohibition. 
 
†  Associate Dean and Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford 
University. I thank Jonathan Adler for the invitation to participate in 
this wonderful conversation about marijuana and federalism, as well as 
my panelists, Ernie Young and Rob Mikos. To Kirk Shaw and the staff 
of the Case Western Reserve Law Review, I owe a sincere debt of 
gratitude for their patience and understanding.  
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Introduction 
As recently as a decade ago, legalization of marijuana for both 
medical and recreational use seemed (forgive me) a pipe dream. Today, 
Colorado and Washington allow marijuana for personal and medicinal 
use. Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized 
possession for personal use. Twenty-one states permit the possession 
and use of marijuana for medical purposes. Public opinion is shifting 
rapidly as well: three-quarters of Americans support decriminalization 
for personal use of marijuana1; 58 percent favor legalization.2 The 
United States appears to be close to a tipping point in the debate over 
legalization. Legal obstacles remain, however, as evidenced by a recent 
suit filed by Nebraska and Oklahoma, asking the Supreme Court to 
exercise its original jurisdiction and enjoin Colorado’s legalization 
regime.3 
The most important of these obstacles is the Controlled Substances 
Act (“CSA”), which classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug and bars 
its production, sale, and possession. The tension between permissive 
state regimes and the federal ban has been only partially eased by a 
2013 memorandum in which the Department of Justice outlined its 
enforcement priorities and promised, in effect, to permit state 
legalization experiments to continue as long as the states policed 
themselves and minimized spillover effects in other states.4 
Nevertheless, the fact that cultivation and sale of marijuana remains 
illegal under federal law has created legal uncertainty, causing 
 
1. Pew Research Center, Section 2: Views of Marijuana—Legalization, 
Decriminalization, Concerns (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/04/02/section-2-views-of-marijuana-legalization-
decriminalization-concerns/. 
2. Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S., 
Gallup.com, http://www.gallup.com/poll/179195/majority-continues-
support-pot-legalization.aspx. 
3. Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support, 
Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No. 22O144 ORG (U.S. 2014) 
[hereinafter Nebraska & Oklahoma Complaint], available at http://www. 
ok.gov/oag/documents/NE%20%20OK%20v%20%20CO%20-%20Origina 
l%20Action.pdf; see also Jack Healy, 2 Neighbors of Colorado Sue Over 
Marijuana Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 2014, at A21 (providing back-
ground on spillover effects of Marijuana legalization in Colorado).  
4. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to United 
States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 
2013) [hereinafter Cole Memorandum], available at http://www.justice. 
gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and Legal Obstacles 
to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts 
569 
numerous problems for businesses, especially in the areas of banking 
and insurance.5 
Moreover, as the suit by Nebraska and Oklahoma highlights, there 
is considerable uncertainty surrounding the preemptive effects of the 
CSA on state legalization efforts. Because Colorado and Washington 
legalized marijuana in the face of continued federal criminalization, the 
states’ efforts present questions of “vertical federalism”—“how power is 
or should be allocated between the federal and state tiers of 
government, and how to prevent the federal and state governments 
from encroaching on each other’s prerogatives.”6 
Other aspects of legalization raise questions of “horizontal feder-
alism,” which Professor Erbsen has described “as encompassing the set 
of constitutional mechanisms for preventing or mitigating interstate 
friction that may arise from the out-of-state effects of in-state 
decisions.”7 Horizontal federalism doctrines are frequently described as 
designed to combat externalities and spillover effects.8 Colorado, for 
example, restricts the amount of marijuana that out-of-state residents 
can purchase per visit to a licensed dispensary in an effort to minimize 
spillovers.9 Such differential treatment, however, could garner Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges,10 as did efforts to combat the importation 
 
5. See Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 597 (2015) (describing the legal difficulties banks have in 
handling money from marijuana-involved businesses). 
6. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493, 502 (2008). 
7. Id. at 503. 
8. As Heather Gerken and Ari Holtzblatt colorfully put it, 
In horizontal federalism, the story of conflict is a tragedy in 
waiting—a cautionary tale about norms upended and the looming 
threat of instability. That tale centers on a single narrative: 
lawyers hate spillovers. And no wonder. There is something 
disquieting about one state’s citizenry regulating another’s. 
Spillovers don’t just generate conflict but unsettle deeply held 
normative commitments to sovereignty, territoriality, and self-
rule. 
  Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of 
Horizontal Federalism, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 57, 66 (2014). 
9. See Brannon P. Denning, One Toke Over the (State) Line: Constitutional 
Limits on “Pot Tourism” Restrictions, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 2279, 2280 (2014) 
(describing nonresident purchase limits). 
10. Id. at 2283–99 (assessing the vulnerability of Colorado’s nonresident 
purchase limits to challenges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine). 
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of alcohol into dry states before the passage and ratification of the 
Eighteenth Amendment.11 
Of course, as Erbsen notes, vertical and horizontal federalism 
questions are often intertwined because “federal power is a mechanism 
for restraining state power.”12 He notes that “federal institutions play a 
coordinating role in the exercise of concurrent state authority” by 
approving interstate compacts, for example.13 In addition,  
some grants of exclusive or preemptive power to the federal 
government serve both a vertical allocation function and a hori-
zontal conflict avoidance function. For example, Congress’s power 
to regulate interstate commerce both establishes federal 
supremacy over a national market and allows Congress to 
intervene when regulation of regional markets by multiple states 
creates a possibility of excessive friction.14  
State legalization—and the recent suit by Oklahoma and 
Nebraska—furnish a vivid example of how these concepts quickly meld. 
Despite a certain artificiality, I will use the concepts of vertical and 
horizontal federalism as frames for particular aspects of the legalization 
debate I wish to explore in this Article. This Article examines the 
challenges that vertical and horizontal federalism doctrines pose to the 
ongoing legalization experiment and suggest a role for Congress (and 
perhaps the Supreme Court) to play in facilitating—as opposed to 
inhibiting or retarding—that experiment. 
Part I examines the effect of federal law, under which marijuana is 
still illegal to produce, possess, or purchase, on state laws legalizing it. 
Part II discusses how horizontal federalism doctrines could inhibit 
states that legalize from trying to prevent spillover effects in 
neighboring states that have chosen not to adopt a more liberal regime. 
Here there are some lessons to be learned from the last intoxicant to 
pit states against one another and the federal government: alcohol. 
Finally, Part III closes with suggestions how the federal government 
could play a constructive role in the legalization experiment. 
 
11. See discussion infra Part II. 
12. Erbsen, supra note 6, at 504. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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I. Vertical Federalism and the Preemption Puzzle 
A. Preemption Generally15 
1.  Express Preemption 
Under Article VI of the Constitution, treaties made by the United 
States and “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance” of the Constitution are the “supreme Law of the Land,” 
notwithstanding contrary state laws or state constitutional provisions.16 
If Congress exercises its valid legislative authority, conflicting state laws 
must give way.17 Easy cases include those in which Congress included 
explicit language preempting contrary state law.18  
But Congress’s intent is not always so unequivocally stated. As the 
Court has noted, 
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least 
two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the 
scheme of federal regulation is “‘so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States 
to supplement it,’” . . . and conflict pre-emption, where 
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility,” . . . or where state law “stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”19 
 
15. This preemption summary borrows from Brannon P. Denning, Environ-
mental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 64 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 1519, 1521–24 (2014). 
16. U.S. Const. art. VI; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 
505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, 
and ‘is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the 
statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’” 
(quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))). 
17. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824) (concluding 
that possession of valid federal coasting license by steamboat operator 
preempted state law granting competitor a monopoly on passage service 
between New York and New Jersey). 
18. See, e.g., Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 970 (2012) (con-
cluding that the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s preemption clause “pre-
vents a State from imposing any additional or different—even if non-
conflicting—requirements that fall within the scope of the Act and con-
cern a slaughterhouse’s facilities or operations”). 
19. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (citations omitted). 
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The Court’s “ultimate task in any pre-emption case is to determine 
whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose 
of the statute as a whole.”20 
2.  Implied Preemption 
Where Congress has not expressly preempted state legislation, the 
Court has found an implied intent to preempt in two broad categories 
of cases. Field preemption “reflects a congressional decision to foreclose 
any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal 
standards.”21 Conflict preemption, on the other hand, impliedly 
preempts state laws that either make compliance with state and federal 
law impossible (impossibility preemption)22 or, if compliance with both 
is possible, nevertheless presents an obstacle to one or more 
congressional purposes (obstacle preemption).  
Obstacle preemption is more subjective than impossibility 
preemption. In obstacle preemption cases, compliance with both federal 
and state regulatory regimes is possible, but in some cases the state 
regulatory choices are inconsistent with or harmful to broader federal 
policy objectives set by Congress. For example, in Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council,23 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law 
prohibiting the Commonwealth from contracting with companies that 
did business with the government of Myanmar. Because Congress 
considered and rejected much more wide-ranging penalties for 
companies currently doing business in the country, choosing instead to 
prohibit only new investment, the Court concluded that “the state 
Burma law [was] an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s full 
objectives under the federal Act.”24 
 
20. Id. 
21. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012); e.g., United States 
v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000) (preempting state regulations governing 
design, construction, repair, equipping, and crewing of tankers because 
the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act meant that “Congress has 
left no room for state regulation of these matters”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941) (preempting state alien registration statute and 
rejecting argument that requirements were parallel to and not in conflict 
with federal requirements). 
22. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133–34 (1913) (pre-
empting state statute governing labeling of corn syrup because complying 
with state law would have violated federal law). 
23. 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
24. Id. at 373–74. Similarly, one provision of Arizona’s controversial immi-
gration law, which prohibited undocumented aliens from working, apply-
ing for, or soliciting work in the state, was invalidated because it 
“enact[ed] a state criminal prohibition where no federal counterpart ex-
ists.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503. Congress, the Court held, “made a 
deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or 
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B. The Prohibitory Federal Regime 
The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 classified marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug for which no medical uses existed and banned its 
production, transfer, and possession.25 Under the federal regime, “all 
marijuana use is considered ‘drug abuse,’” its Schedule I classification 
“reflect[ing] the view that marijuana is dangerous and lacks any 
redeeming qualities.”26 There are a number of ancillary laws, too, 
criminalizing various activities associated with marijuana production or 
transfer.27 To put it mildly, the prohibitory federal regime is in 
considerable tension with the laws of states that permit medical mari-
juana use or—in the case of Colorado and Oregon—have legalized it 
completely. 
C. What Is the Preemptive Effect of the CSA 
on State Legalization Regimes? 
So what is the effect of the near-complete federal prohibition on 
marijuana production and transfer on the more liberal state regimes? 
Until recently, the conventional wisdom was that states were simply 
unable to liberalize their laws, as any liberalization would either create 
 
engage in, unauthorized employment.” Id. at 2504. Arizona’s law, 
however, 
would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with 
respect to unauthorized employment of aliens. Although [the 
Arizona law] attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal 
law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a 
conflict in the method of enforcement. The Court has recognized 
that a “[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the 
system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.” . . . The 
correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history 
of [federal law] is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate 
to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in 
unauthorized employment. It follows that a state law to the 
contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose. 
  Id. at 2505 (citations omitted). 
25. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2012); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 14 (2005) (“By classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, as 
opposed to listing it on a lesser schedule, the manufacture, distribution, 
or possession of marijuana became a criminal offense, with the sole 
exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Admin-
istration preapproved research study.”). 
26. Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. 
Health Care L. & Pol’y 5, 11 (2013). 
27. Id. (describing laws prohibiting employing property to “manufacturing, 
distributing, or using property” for the production of controlled 
substances, as well as laws regarding aiding and abetting violations of the 
CSA or to commit conspiracy to violate the CSA). 
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a conflict between the states and the federal government or would fall 
under the Court’s “obstacle preemption” cases. Prior to legalization, for 
example, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the CSA preempted 
portions of that state’s medical marijuana statute, and thus an 
employer that discharged an employee for medical marijuana use had 
not engaged in prohibited employment discrimination.28 As the court 
explained, 
[Oregon law] affirmatively authorizes the use of medical mari-
juana. The Controlled Substances Act, however, prohibits the use 
of marijuana without regard to whether it is used for medicinal 
purposes. As the Supreme Court has recognized, by classifying 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress has expressed its judg-
ment that marijuana has no recognized medical use. . . . Congress 
did not intend to enact a limited prohibition on the use of 
marijuana—i.e., to prohibit the use of marijuana unless states 
chose to authorize its use for medical purposes. . . . Rather, 
Congress imposed a blanket federal prohibition on the use of 
marijuana without regard to state permission to use marijuana 
for medical purposes. . . .  
Affirmatively authorizing a use that federal law prohibits stands 
as an obstacle to the implementation and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of the Controlled Substances Act. . . . To 
be sure, state law does not prevent the federal government from 
enforcing its marijuana laws against medical marijuana users in 
Oregon if the federal government chooses to do so. But . . . . [t]o 
the extent that [Oregon law] affirmatively authorizes the use of 
medical marijuana, federal law preempts that subsection, leaving 
it “without effect.”29 
In the complaint filed against Colorado, Nebraska and Oklahoma 
make similar claims that the CSA is broadly preemptive of liberalized 
state regimes. The complaint argues that “a state may not establish its 
own policy that is directly counter to federal policy against trafficking 
in controlled substances or establish a state-sanctioned system for 
possession, production, licensing, and distribution of drugs in a manner 
 
28. Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 
518, 531–32 (Or. 2010) (en banc). 
29. Id. at 529 (citations omitted); see also Butler v. Douglas Cnty., Civil No. 
07–6241–HO, 2010 WL 3220199, at *3 (D. Or. 2010) (“There can be no 
doubt that federal law prohibits the use of medical marijuana. In addition, 
although use of medical marijuana and limited growing for others’ use is 
permitted under [Oregon law], a recent decision of the Oregon courts 
confirms that federal law preempts [Oregon law].”). 
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that interferes with the federal drug laws . . . .”30 Later, the complaint 
notes that the federal regime would be “undercut unless the intrastate 
activity . . . were regulated as well as the interstate and international 
activity.”31 Any diversion of marijuana from Colorado to other states, 
moreover, “frustrates the federal interest in eliminating commercial 
transactions in the interstate controlled-substances market” and 
imposes externalities onto neighboring states.32 Colorado’s amendment 
“stands in direct opposition to the CSA” and “conflicts with and 
otherwise stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”33 In the brief accompanying its complaint, Nebraska and 
Oklahoma argue that the issue is “[w]hether a state can affirmatively 
authorize the violation of federal law.”34 It concluded that a state like 
Colorado cannot and that there is a “positive conflict . . . between the 
CSA and Colorado’s Amendment 64.”35 
Professor Rob Mikos, however, says “not so fast.” He argues that 
the preemptive force of the CSA is much less than supposed. Where 
the preemptive effect is unclear, he further urges that doubts should be 
resolved against preemption, lest permissible preemption tip over into 
impermissible (and unconstitutional) commandeering of states.36 In his 
most recent discussion of preemption and the CSA,37 Mikos argues that 
both the CSA’s savings clause, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
 
30. Nebraska & Oklahoma Complaint, supra note 3, at 2. 
31. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 22, 23. 
34. Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 15, Nebraska 
& Oklahoma v. Colorado (filed 2014) (No. 22O144 ORG), Original, at 15 
[hereinafter Brief in Support], available at http://www.ok.gov/oag/ 
documents/NE%20%20OK%20v%20%20CO%20-%20Original%20Action.pdf. 
35. Id. at 24. 
36. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating 
provision of Brady Bill requiring local law enforcement officials to perform 
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down requirement that states 
either pass legislation to deal with disposal of low-level radioactive waste 
or be forced to take title to all such waste produced in the state). On the 
anticommandeering principle generally, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.9, at 329–33 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
37. Mikos, supra note 26. For his earlier writing on the issue, which predated 
Colorado’s vote to legalize marijuana, see Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits 
of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to 
Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421 (2009). 
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anticommandeering decisions impose “three important limitations on 
the preemptive scope of the CSA.”38 
First, under the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine, Congress 
may not preempt state laws that merely legalize marijuana-
related activities. Second, given the federal government’s very 
limited law enforcement capacity, Congress likely did not want 
to preempt any state regulations that help reduce drug abuse. 
Third, even when state regulations increase drug abuse, Congress 
expressly indicated that it only wanted to preempt those that do 
so directly. The courts must heed these limits, and the best way 
to do so would be to adopt a direct conflict rule for adjudicating 
preemption disputes under the CSA.39 
As to his first point, Mikos posits a distinction between “regulating 
and legalizing marijuana,” and he maintains that only by eliding the 
two can one conclude that “state laws that merely allow residents to 
use marijuana free of state-imposed constraints have been preempted 
by the CSA.”40 To preempt state legalization, he argues, crosses the line 
into “commandeering” the state into enforcing the federal prohibitory 
regime.41 Only measures that reduce the cost of marijuana use are 
preempted; those that raise the cost are not.42 Examples of the latter 
include taxing and licensing schemes that are part and parcel of existing 
state legalization efforts. To preempt these, he writes, “would have the 
very perverse effect of relaxing—not tightening—state controls on 
marijuana.”43  
In other words, if Nebraska and Oklahoma were to win in the 
Supreme Court, they would actually lose, according to Mikos. Under 
the anticommandeering principle, the Court could not order Colorado 
to recriminalize marijuana production, distribution, or use.44 Assuming 
the federal government continues to refuse to devote substantial re-
sources to enforcing federal law inside Colorado’s borders, the plaintiff 
states would be left with the worst of both worlds: legalized marijuana 
 
38. Mikos, supra note 26, at 26. 
39. Id. at 26–27. 
40. Id. at 16. 
41. Id. (“Congress may not ‘preempt’ state legalization because doing so 
forces states to keep pre-existing marijuana bans—bans that Congress 
could not force the states to adopt in the first instance.”). 
42. Id. at 18 (writing that “there are strong reasons to believe that Congress 
only wanted to preempt regulations that promote marijuana”). 
43. Id. 
44. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
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with no state oversight. Such an outcome would likely increase the 
number and magnitude of any spillover effects, not reduce them. 
Under Mikos’s proposed “direct conflict” rule, the CSA would 
preempt only those state laws that Congress directly intended to pre-
empt by passage of the CSA, as opposed to those laws it either did not 
intend to preempt or those that only “indirectly frustrate[]” 
congressional aims.45 An example of the former would be a state-run 
monopoly on marijuana retail, something along the lines of the control-
state model for alcohol.46 He argues, however, that neither legalization,47 
rules decriminalizing consumption,48 nondiscrimination rules that 
prevent punishment of individuals for marijuana use,49 nor the provision 
of public benefits to marijuana users are in direct conflict with the 
CSA.50 Mikos stresses that because one may comply with state 
legalization regimes and the federal prohibitory regime by declining to 
use marijuana, there is neither a conflict between these laws nor do the 
legalization laws pose any obstacle to the accomplishment of the CSA’s 
intended aims.51 
 
45. See Mikos, supra note 26, at 23–24 (distinguishing between Type I 
errors—condemnation of “state laws Congress could not or did not want 
to preempt” or that “indirectly frustrate[]” congressional aims—and Type 
II errors in which laws are upheld that Congress did wish to preempt). 
46. Id. at 34–35 (“State cultivation and distribution of marijuana would 
clearly pose a direct conflict with the CSA. The state itself would be 
violating Section 841’s prohibition on the cultivation/distribution of 
marijuana, no less than private dispensaries do now.”). 
47. Id. at 27 (arguing that “legalization of marijuana under state law does 
not pose a direct conflict with the CSA”). 
48. Id. at 31–32 (explaining that marijuana consumption rules likewise 
“clearly do not pose a direct conflict with the CSA” because one may 
simply refrain from consuming marijuana and comply with both regimes). 
49. Id. (arguing the same for state rules preventing punishment of “individ-
uals based on their status as drug users” because “[t]he CSA does not 
prohibit anyone from housing drug users”).  
50. Id. at 35 (“Unlike providing marijuana, providing public benefits to 
medical marijuana users does not necessarily pose a direct conflict with 
the CSA. After all, the CSA does not forbid anyone from feeding, housing, 
or providing medical care to people who use drugs.”). 
51. Id. at 27–28. 
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I agree with Mikos52 that § 903 of the CSA53 takes field preemption 
off the table. But I think that Mikos overreads the effect of that savings 
clause. I find it hard to believe that the Congress in 1968 had 
legalization regimes in mind and intended to signal to courts that they 
should not preempt them. It is more likely that Congress wrote § 903 
to prevent the preemption of more draconian criminal penalties that 
some states then had in place. I likewise concede that there is no explicit 
prohibition of state legalization in the CSA. That omission would seem 
to take any argument for express preemption off the table as well. 
(Although I think it fair to point out that likely no one voting for the 
1968 CSA likely envisioned a swift move toward legalization of 
marijuana for medical or recreational use either.) 
The issue then is whether the CSA impliedly preempts state 
legalization efforts under either impossibility or obstacle types of 
conflict preemption and, if so, who might have standing to bring a claim 
to invoke the preemptive power of the CSA against permissive state 
marijuana regimes? The remainder of this section addresses the conflict 
preemption question; the next subsection will take up the standing 
issue. 
Mikos dismisses any claim that permissive state regimes present 
impossibility conflicts. It is entirely possible to comply with the 
proscriptive federal regime embodied in the CSA and a more permissive 
regime like Colorado’s, he argues, by simply not engaging in the activity 
that Colorado has authorized. This argument seems to me to carry 
“verbal wizardry too far, deep into the forbidden land of the sophists.”54 
If that were the test, then a finding of impossibility preemption could 
always be avoided simply by refraining from engaging in the activity 
that is the object of the conflicting regulatory regimes. To make any 
sense, “impossibility” must be viewed from the perspective of one who 
is engaging in the very conduct regulated by both state and federal 
governments. Otherwise, one could say that McDermott v. Wisconsin55 
was wrongly decided because compliance with both regimes was not 
impossible as long as one refrained from bottling corn syrup.56 It is 
impossible for a person who chooses to consume marijuana in 
 
52. Id. at 12–14 (arguing that § 903 rebuts the notion that Congress meant 
to preempt the field of drug regulation or that “Congress necessarily 
intended to preempt all conflicts” with the CSA). Nebraska and 
Oklahoma likewise concede that the CSA does not occupy the field. Brief 
in Support, supra note 34, at 18. 
53. Mikos, supra note 26, at 12–14. 
54. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2656 (2012) (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
55. 228 U.S. 115 (1913). 
56. Id. at 131. 
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compliance with state laws where legal not to also be in violation of the 
CSA at the same time.57 
Even if the courts,58 as well as commentators,59 are correct and the 
universe of true impossibility conflicts is quite limited, the obstacle 
conflict argument against liberal state-legal regimes seems pretty solid. 
The goal of the CSA, as the Court has told us, was to eliminate the 
interstate market in marijuana (and other Schedule I drugs).60 In order 
to do so, it passed the ban as part of its commerce power. That power, 
the Court further noted, extended to all participants in that market, 
no matter how local or how noncommercial their participation was.61 
Liberal regimes like Colorado’s and Washington’s are diametrically 
opposed to the goal of eliminating the market for marijuana. It is 
difficult to characterize these as other than posing an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of a congressional objective. It seems axiomatic that 
the Supremacy Clause and preemption doctrine prohibit states 
authorizing conduct that federal law prohibits.  
Mikos argues that because many of the state legalization laws 
contain requirements that attempt to prevent abuse, those laws further, 
rather than hinder, the achievement of the CSA’s goal—to combat drug 
abuse.62 But I would argue that the means used by Congress to achieve 
that goal could also itself be seen as an independent goal: the 
elimination of the national market for marijuana. The elimination of 
 
57. To be fair, however, the Supreme Court interprets impossibility pre-
emption to require that “federal law may be in ‘irreconcilable conflict’ 
with state law,” meaning that they “impose directly conflicting duties on 
national banks—as they would . . . if the federal law said, ‘you must sell 
insurance,’ while the state law said, ‘you may not.’” Barnett Bank of 
Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996). 
58. Id.; see also Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 
230 P.3d 518, 528 (Or. 2009) (“The Court has applied the physical 
impossibility prong narrowly.”). 
59. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 228 (2000) (describing 
the scope of the impossibility prong as “vanishingly narrow”). 
60. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14 (2005) (“By classifying marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug, as opposed to listing it on a lesser schedule, the 
manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana became a criminal 
offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food 
and Drug Administration preapproved research study.”). 
61. Id. at 22 (“Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing 
between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere . . . 
and concerns about diversion into illicit channels, we have no difficulty 
concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to 
regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would 
leave a gaping hole in the CSA. . . . That the regulation ensnares some 
purely intrastate activity is of no moment.” (internal citations omitted)). 
62. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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that national market was at the heart of Gonzales v. Raich.63 Because 
it was undoubtedly within congressional power to eliminate the cross-
border movement of marijuana, Congress could also rely on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to aid it in eliminating that market, 
including the noncommercial possession of locally grown marijuana for 
medical purposes as permitted by state law.64 
Had prevention of abuse been the sole purpose of the CSA, then 
the plaintiffs in Raich, it seems to me, would have had a stronger case. 
Because they were using marijuana for medical purposes under the 
auspices of state law, not abusing the drug or even using it 
recreationally, the plaintiffs could have made a case for isolating their 
use from the illicit uses the CSA was intended to stamp out. The Raich 
Court, however, simply focused on Congress’s intent to eliminate the 
national market, then reasoned that because it could eliminate the 
interstate market in marijuana under its commerce power, it could 
reach all marijuana possession or production no matter how local or 
noncommercial.65 
At the risk of seeming obtuse, I find it self-evident that state 
legalization regimes permitting marijuana use for medical or recreat-
ional purposes present a substantial obstacle to the implementation of 
a federal law that (1) recognizes no medical use for marijuana and (2) 
seeks to eliminate the national market in marijuana by banning all 
production, possession, and transfer. The preemption puzzle, for me, 
remains. Only the DOJ’s announced policy of forbearance keeps this 
 
63. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24 (“The regulatory scheme [of the CSA] is designed 
to foster the beneficial use of those medications, to prevent their misuse, 
and to prohibit entirely the possession of use of substances listed in 
Schedule I, except as a part of a strictly controlled research project.” 
(emphasis added)). 
64. Id. at 22 (“Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation 
to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was 
acting well within its authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
65. Id. at 32 (“Congress could have rationally concluded that the aggregate 
impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted from 
federal supervision is unquestionably substantial.”). As Nebraska and 
Oklahoma point out in their brief, the Court held that the CSA applied 
to the plaintiffs in Raich despite the fact that “[t]he California scheme 
was . . . a purely non-commercial compassionate use–based regime.” Brief 
in Support, supra note 34, at 18. Nevertheless, “[t]he Court . . . soundly 
rejected the notion that the marijuana growing and use at issue ‘were not 
‘an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme’ because they had been 
‘isolated by the State of California and [are] policed by the State of 
California,’ and thus remain ‘entirely separated from the market.’’” Id. at 
21 (alteration in original) (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 27). 
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conflict from coming to a head—unless the Supreme Court decides to 
hear Oklahoma and Nebraska’s lawsuit. 
Mikos argues that broad obstacle preemption arguments, like the 
one I made above, cannot be correct, because they run afoul of the 
anticommandeering principle.66 Holding that state legalization efforts 
pose an obstacle to the achievement of Congress’s aims in passing the 
CSA, he posits, would basically conscript state officials in the federal 
scheme to eliminate the market in Schedule I drugs. Congress may no 
more do this, he maintains, than it could require state and local exec-
utive officials to conduct background checks on prospective gun buy-
ers.67  
But the Court has recognized that unless it has a limiting principle, 
the anticommandeering doctrine could read the Supremacy Clause out 
of the Constitution. In Reno v. Condon,68 decided just three years after 
Printz v. United States,69 the Court unanimously rejected South 
Carolina’s argument that forcing states to comply with a valid federal 
statute prohibiting the sale of driver’s license data impermissibly 
commandeered the officials who would have to obey the act. 
South Carolina contends that the [Driver’s Privacy Protection 
Act] violates the Tenth Amendment because it “thrusts upon the 
States all of the day-to-day responsibility for administering its 
complex provisions,” . . . and thereby makes “state officials the 
unwilling implementors of federal policy” . . . . South Carolina 
emphasizes that the DPPA requires the State’s employees to 
learn and apply the Act’s substantive restrictions, which are 
summarized above, and notes that these activities will consume 
the employees’ time and thus the State’s resources. South 
Carolina further notes that the DPPA’s penalty provisions hang 
over the States as a potential punishment should they fail to 
comply with the Act.70 
 
66. See supra notes 36–51 and accompanying text. 
67. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating provision of 
Brady Bill requiring local law enforcement officials to perform background 
checks on prospective handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down requirement that states either pass 
legislation to deal with disposal of low-level radioactive waste or be forced 
to take title to all such waste produced in the state). 
68. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
69. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
70. Reno, 528 U.S. at 149–50. 
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The Court responded that 
the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity 
to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the States as 
the owners of data bases. It does not require the South Carolina 
Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not 
require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal 
statutes regulating private individuals. We accordingly conclude 
that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles 
enunciated in New York and Printz.71 
One might argue that, at most, Reno stands for the proposition 
that the CSA forbids states like Colorado or Washington from mono-
polizing the wholesale and retail marijuana market, as so-called “control 
states” do with liquor.72 As Mikos argues, the anticommandeering 
principle would prohibit a court from ordering either Colorado legis-
lators to recriminalize marijuana production, possession, and sale or 
Colorado law enforcement officers to prosecute people under federal 
law.73 Presumably, moreover, a federal court would be reluctant to 
order the federal government to enforce the CSA within the state. So 
what good would the injunction be that Oklahoma and Nebraska seek? 
Arguably, the injunction would not only be futile but would be 
counterproductive, resulting in more problems, not fewer, for the 
plaintiff states, because an injunction would shut down the licensing 
and regulatory regime intended to minimize externalities. Disabling 
those controls could result into the “Wild West,” where anything goes 
because, under state law, marijuana use would not be illegal and the 
state could not be compelled by a federal court to recriminalize it. 
I wonder whether the choice between an orderly marijuana market 
versus the “Wild West” is a false one. While it is true that the 
anticommandeering principle places limits on the ability to conscript 
state officials in enforcing the CSA, if a court enjoined the implement-
ation of Amendment Sixty-Four, eliminating the orderly market envis-
ioned by the drafters, there is the possibility that Colorado would, of 
its own accord, recriminalize marijuana as a matter of state law to 
prevent chaos that might accompany sudden deregulation. By the same 
 
71. Id. at 151. 
72. See Nat’l Alcohol Beverage Control Ass’n, About NABCA, NABCA. 
org, http://www.nabca.org/page/about (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) 
(“Founded in 1938, [the National Alcohol Beverage Control Association] 
is the national association representing the Control State Systems—those 
jurisdictions that directly control the distribution and sale of beverage 
alcohol within their borders.”). 
73. See supra notes 36–51 and accompanying text. 
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token, a spike in illegal activity, including spillovers into other states, 
might be precisely the thing that would trigger federal intervention.74 
D. Would Anyone Have Standing to Enjoin Liberal State Laws? 
Just because preemption remains an issue, however, does not 
necessarily doom any of the existing state regimes. Because the federal 
government has adopted a policy of benign neglect, the question arises, 
Who would have standing to enforce federal law against the states? In 
this section, I suggest that states may be able to invoke parens patriae 
standing to sue other states that have legalized marijuana or seek 
enforcement of federal law against individuals. States might even be 
able to sue the federal government in an effort to force the government 
to enforce its laws against states with permissive marijuana laws. 
The core of Article III standing requires plaintiffs to demonstrate 
(1) injury-in-fact; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to actions of the 
defendant; and (3) that a favorable court decision would, in fact, 
remedy the injury suffered by the plaintiff.75 Injury-in-fact means that 
the plaintiff has suffered some kind of concrete and particularized injury 
that is either actual or imminent, as opposed to hypothetical or 
speculative.76 
At first blush, it seems difficult to conceive of a plaintiff who could 
satisfy those requirements. After all, an individual from, say, Nebraska 
or Oklahoma suing the state of Colorado to enjoin its legalization 
regime would seem to lack any injury-in-fact. Simply wishing to see 
federal law enforced or forcing state officials to comply with federal law 
seems to be precisely the kind of “generalized grievance” that the Court 
has held is better addressed to the political branches.77 
But imagine this scenario: A state bordering Colorado (for example, 
Nebraska or Oklahoma) finds itself awash in marijuana purchased 
legally in Colorado then brought back into the state illegally. Let us 
further assume that there has been a spike in hospitalizations of 
children for overdosing on Colorado-purchased edibles.78 In such a case, 
an argument could be made that the State itself could sue either 
 
74. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 4. 
75. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
76. Id. at 560. 
77. E.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
78. See Steven Reinburg, Kids Poisoned by Medical Marijuana, Study Finds, 
U.S. News & World Rep. (May 27, 2013, 4:00 PM), 
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/news/articles/2013/05/27/kids-
poisoned-by-medical-marijuana-study-finds. 
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individuals or the State of Colorado as parens patriae seeking some sort 
of injunctive relief.79 
In the leading case, Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,80 
the Commonwealth sued a group of private apple growers for alleged 
violation of federal law governing the recruitment and importation of 
foreign agricultural workers.81 The growers challenged Puerto Rico’s 
standing to bring suit; the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s 
conclusion that Puerto Rico could sue under parens patriae standing. 
In order to sue as parens patriae, the Court emphasized that a state 
must be asserting a “a ‘quasi-sovereign’ interest” as opposed to a 
proprietary or other interest.82 Though emphasizing that this interest 
“is a judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact 
definition,” the Court did identify two such interests.83 “First, the 
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the 
relevant jurisdiction—this involves the power to create and enforce a 
legal code, both civil and criminal.”84 The second is a “demand for 
recognition from other sovereigns—most frequently [involving] the 
maintenance and recognition of borders.”85 The common thread, the 
Court explained, was that “[q]uasi-sovereign interests . . . consist of a 
set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace [and] 
must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy between 
the State and the defendant.”86 
 
79. C.f. 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.11.1 (3d ed. 2008) 
(discussing state standing); Calvin Massey, State Standing After 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 249 (2009) (analyzing state 
standing after the Court’s decision changed the meaning of the standing 
elements depending on the type of litigant and claim); Ann Woolhandler 
& Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 387 (1995) 
(providing a historical overview of state standing). See also Jody Freeman 
& Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 
2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51 (2007) (discussing the effects of Massachusetts v. 
EPA). 
80. 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
81. Id. at 595–99. 
82. Id. at 601–02 (distinguishing semi-sovereign interests from a state’s 
proprietary interests and those cases in which the state is but a nominal 
party and pursuing claims on behalf of its citizens in their private 
capacities). 
83. Id. at 601. 
84. Id.  
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 602. 
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By way of example, the Court in Alfred L. Snapp & Son sum-
marized a number of cases, beginning with Louisiana v. Texas,87 which 
“involved the State’s interest in the abatement of public nuisances, 
instances in which the injury to the public health and comfort was 
graphic and direct.”88 The Court then summarized its holding: 
In order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State must 
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private 
parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The 
State must express a quasi-sovereign interest. . . . These 
characteristics fall into two general categories. First, a State has 
a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both 
physical and economic—of its residents in general. Second, a 
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily 
denied its rightful status within the federal system.89 
When deciding whether the state is truly representing distinct 
interests of its populace, as opposed to being a mere nominal party for 
private litigants, the Court said indirect effects on the population could 
be considered. Another factor was “whether the injury is one that the 
State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign 
lawmaking powers.”90 The Court then held that under either of the two 
quasi-sovereign interests it articulated, Puerto Rico had standing to sue 
the growers in federal court.91 
Recently, the Court again found state standing in Massachusetts v. 
EPA,92 holding that the State of Massachusetts could sue the EPA for 
failure to make rules regulating carbon dioxide emissions from 
automobiles under the Clean Air Act.93 The Court appeared to relax 
the injury-in-fact and redressability standards, at least in part because 
it was a state bringing the claim. Though the majority certainly evoked 
parens patriae in its decision,94 it is difficult to characterize it as a pure 
example of parens patriae, in part because Massachusetts was asserting 
proprietary interests in the maintenance of its coastal properties that 
 
87. 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
88. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 604–05. 
89. Id. at 607. 
90. Id. at 608 (footnote omitted). 
91. Id. at 609–10. 
92. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
93. Id. at 526. 
94. Id. at 518–19. 
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were threatened by rising sea levels.95 Nevertheless, as one commentator 
observed, the most plausible explanation for the case’s outcome is that 
it is a parens patriae case in which the Court had “definitely repudiated 
[the] broad assertion that only the federal government could act as 
parens patriae with respect to rights or obligations arising under federal 
law.”96 
Whatever Massachusetts v. EPA did or did not do to parens patriae 
standing, even under the Alfred L. Snapp & Son criteria, a state like 
Nebraska (or Oklahoma), under the conditions that I described above, 
could muster plausible arguments. First, a flood of illicit marijuana 
coming from Colorado combined with evidence that children and others 
were being harmed as a result would seem to qualify as quasi-sovereign 
interest. Nebraska no doubt has an interest in the “health and well-
being” of its citizens, which under my scenario is being imperiled by 
Colorado’s legalization. The analogy that comes to mind is that of one 
state permitting activity within its boundaries that produce pollution 
affecting another state. As I read the cases, Nebraska could either file 
suit in federal court seeking an injunction against all of the licensed 
dispensers of marijuana in Colorado97 or—by invoking the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction—against the State of Colorado itself.98 
(Nebraska and Oklahoma, of course, chose the latter route.) 
In addition to injury-in-fact, causation and redressability could be 
satisfied as well. But for the permissive regime or the sellers that have 
taken advantage of it to peddle their wares, the injury would not have 
occurred. And even if some illicit marijuana would fill the void left by 
a dismantling of Colorado’s legalization regime, Massachusetts suggests 
that even some likely reduction in harm will suffice to satisfy 
redressability, at least where the state is a party.99 
* * * 
 
95. Id. at 538–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Massey, supra note 79, at 262–
63. 
96. Massey, supra note 79, at 268. 
97. Cf. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 
(2001) (considering a case arising when the federal government sought an 
injunction against several California cannabis sellers for violating the 
Controlled Substances Act). 
98. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (defining “original jurisdiction” of the 
Supreme Court to include “all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party”); 
17 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4045 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing suits between 
states under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction).  
99. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525–26. 
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As courts and commentators have recognized, conducting a real 
experiment with legalization is difficult given the continued existence 
of the restrictive regime embodied in the CSA. More permissive state 
regimes are in considerable tension with marijuana’s classification as a 
Schedule I drug at the federal level. Despite able arguments to the 
contrary, I continue to believe that preemption poses a real threat to 
state legalization efforts (and even initiatives like compassionate use 
that stop short of legalization). I also believe that judicial holdings that 
preemption of more permissive state approaches by CSA would not 
violate the anticommandeering principle. As I will argue in Part III, 
Congress could play a constructive role by clarifying the legal status of 
these policy experiments, while protecting the rights of states to make 
different policy choices when it comes to marijuana. The obstacles that 
constitutional federalism could present to states vis-à-vis other states 
are discussed in the next Part. 
II. Horizontal Federalism and 
the Prevention of Spillover Effects 
Constitutional federalism not only structures the interactions be-
tween the federal and state governments, but it also places limits on 
how states interact with one another, one another’s citizens, and with 
cross-border activity like interstate commerce. Doctrines governing 
horizontal federalism, then, also merit some consideration when dis-
cussing legalization efforts. 
I will largely restrict my discussion here to two such doctrines: the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine (the DCCD) and, to a lesser 
extent, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Both play 
important roles in the prevention of favoritism or “naked preferences”100 
for states’ own citizens that can fray the bonds of political union. But 
the doctrines can also hinder states either from taking action to protect 
their own citizens from perceived threats to their health and wellbeing 
or from taking action to prevent harmful spillover effects that might 
create friction with neighboring states.101 
The DCCD is the set of judge-made decision rules that limit a 
state’s ability to discriminate against or otherwise unduly burden 
 
100. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1689, 1689 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
a number of seemingly disparate clauses of the Constitution “are united 
by a common theme and focused on a single underlying evil: the 
distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another 
solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political 
power to obtain what they want”). 
101. For an examination of aspects of Colorado’s legalization regime that is 
relevant to what follows, see Denning, supra note 9. 
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interstate commerce. For non-tax regulations,102 constitutionality turns 
on whether or not a state or local law “discriminates” against interstate 
commerce or commercial actors.103 Discriminatory laws will be subject 
to a form of strict scrutiny requiring the government to prove that (1) 
the law furthers “legitimate” (i.e., nonprotectionist) purposes and (2) 
no less discriminatory means are available to it to further those 
interests.104 Truly nondiscriminatory laws are subject to a deferential 
balancing test that requires the challenger to demonstrate that the 
burdens on interstate commerce “clearly exce[ed]” the putative local 
benefits.105  
Another doctrinal branch of the DCCD is worth mentioning: older 
Supreme Court decisions barred “extraterritorial” legislation in which 
State A attempted directly to control activities taking place in State 
B.106 Elsewhere,107 I have suggested that this branch has been effectively 
limited to circumstances in which State A attempted to dictate the 
prices for goods in State B and that subsequent decisions have 
repudiated the much broader formulations of the doctrine.108 Never-
theless, plaintiffs still bring broad extraterritorial claims; some could be 
 
102. The DCCD’s limits on taxes are set out in the so-called Complete Auto 
test, named for the case in which they were announced. Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). To pass muster under the 
DCCD, state and local taxing jurisdictions must (1) have a substantial 
nexus with the taxpayer; (2) the taxes may not discriminate against 
interstate commerce; (3) the taxes must be fairly apportioned; and (4) 
they must “fairly relate” to the services provided to the taxpayer by the 
taxing jurisdiction. Id. at 277–78. Each of these prongs has been 
extensively litigated. See generally 1 Jerome R. Hellerstein et al., 
State Taxation (3d ed. 1998) (providing an overview of constitutional 
limitations on state taxation). 
103. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (noting that 
discriminatory regulation is subject to a “virtually per se” rule of 
unconstitutionality). Note that discrimination need not be explicit. The 
Court has held that a facially neutral law can be discriminatory in its 
purposes, as in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 268, 271 (1984), 
or in its effects, as in Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertisers Comm’n, 
432 U.S. 333, 350–51 (1970). 
104. E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
105. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
106. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335–37 (1989) (striking down 
an alcohol pricing law with effects on out-of-state prices); Baldwin v. 
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527–28 (1935) (invalidating a New York 
law affecting out-of-state milk prices). 
107. Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 La. L. Rev. 979 (2013). 
108. Id. at 992–93. 
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made against certain state attempts to maintain restrictive marijuana 
regimes. 
To get a sense of how horizontal federalism can restrict state policy 
choices, consider the experience of states in trying to control the spread 
of another popular intoxicant that produced quite serious externalities: 
alcohol. Despite the Court’s early solicitude for states wishing to control 
the liquor trade,109 beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Court issued decisions severely limiting the states’ ability to interdict 
the importation of alcohol at the border. In Bowman v. Chicago & 
Northwest Railway,110 for example, the Court invalidated an Iowa law 
that restricted the production or sale of alcohol as applied to beer 
imported from Illinois.111 The Court held that this was a “direct” 
regulation of interstate commerce that the several states were not 
competent to undertake.112 Two years later, in Leisy v. Hardin,113 the 
Court formally overruled The License Cases,114 holding that “interstate 
liquor transactions were a subject matter calling for uniformity”115 and 
that liquor shipments in their “original packages” were not susceptible 
to state regulation. Moreover, the Court concluded, “the right to import 
included the right to sell the imported liquor in the original package, 
because the sale was integral to the importation.”116 Leisy resulted in a 
proliferation of retail establishments in prohibition states that some 
termed “Supreme Court saloons.”117  
In response, Congress passed the first in a series of laws intended 
to safeguard states’ policy choices on the alcohol question. In 1890, it 
passed the Wilson Act, which subjected all intoxicating liquors 
imported into a state “to the operation and effect of the laws of such 
State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the 
 
109. See, e.g., The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573–86 (1847) (Taney, 
C.J.) (upholding restrictions on liquor sales as a permissible exercise of 
state police powers).  
110. 125 U.S. 465 (1888). 
111. Id. at 500. 
112. Id. at 479. 
113. 135 U.S. 100 (1890). 
114.  Id. at 124. 
115. 8 OWEN M. FISS, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS 
OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 274 (1993). 
116. Id. 
117. Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment 69 (1995) 
(writing that “[w]ithin a month of [Leisy], ‘original package houses’ and 
‘supreme court saloons’ had sprung up in every prohibition state”). 
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same extent and in the same manner” as though they had been pro-
duced there, whether or not they were in their “original packages.”118 
The Wilson Act was upheld, and the principle established that Congress 
had the ability to “overrule” the DCCD by “redelegating” power to the 
states by exercising its affirmative Article I powers.119  
Personnel changes on the Court,120 however, occasioned a somewhat 
more restrictive reading of the Act than was perhaps intended. In 
Rhodes v. Iowa,121 for example, the Court interpreted the Act to permit 
a state to regulate foreign liquor after its “arrival” in the state 
and, according to [Chief Justice] White, liquor did not “arrive” in 
the state until it was delivered to the person who ordered it (the 
consignee). As a practical matter, . . . the states were able to 
prohibit the person to whom the liquor was delivered from selling 
it within the dry state; the states were allowed to outlaw the 
retail outlet. On the other hand, the states could not intervene 
prior to delivery to the consignee, even after the liquor crossed 
the state line.122 
The same year as Rhodes, the Court invalidated a South Carolina 
law prohibiting the importation of liquor as applied to consignments 
for personal use.123 The Court’s stingy interpretation of the Wilson Act 
gave rise to the more effective Webb-Kenyon Act, passed in 1913.124 By 
the time of its passage, however, sentiment for prohibition had grown, 
culminating in the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. However, 
the principle was now firmly established that Congress could, in the 
exercise of its affirmative power to regulate interstate commerce, 
effectively “disable” the DCCD and permit states to regulate in ways 
that the doctrine would otherwise prohibit.  
 
118. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C. 
§ 121 (2006)). The impetus of the Act was a statement in Leisy v. Hardin 
seeming to invite Congress to use its affirmative power over interstate 
commerce to change the default rule against state action embodied in the 
DCCD. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 108; Fiss, supra note 115, at 275. 
119. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891). 
120. Fiss, supra note 115, at 278 (“By the late 1890s all the justices who had 
joined [Chief Justice Melville] Fuller’s opinion in Leisy had left the Court, 
and there were now five new justices . . . Brown, Shiras, White, Peckham, 
and McKenna.”). 
121. 170 U.S. 412 (1898). 
122. Fiss, supra note 115, at 279. 
123. Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 453–57 (1898). 
124. Pub. L. No. 62-398, 37 Stat. 699 (1913). The Act was passed over a 
presidential veto, then upheld by the Court in Clark Distilling Co. v. W. 
Md. Rwy. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 325–32 (1917). 
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The earlier experience with state regulation of alcohol has some 
lessons for marijuana. First, the DCCD could end up being a consti-
tutional obstacle to states’ regulatory efforts. Though doctrine no 
longer immunizes interstate commerce qua interstate commerce from 
state regulation, differential treatment between in- and out-of-state 
products or economic actors will trigger the DCCD’s version of strict 
scrutiny. That means, for example, that Colorado’s law limiting 
nonresidents to purchasing a quarter-ounce of marijuana per dispensary 
visit, as opposed to the full ounce that residents are entitled to buy, 
could be challenged. A host of licensing and permitting requirements 
treating residents and nonresidents differently are buried in state 
compassionate use and recreational use statutes. One could even 
imagine a future in which a state that legalized marijuana and devoted 
resources to ensuring uniform dosage and potency of marijuana 
produced in the state would seek to keep out “inferior” or “unsafe” out-
of-state or foreign marijuana.  
Just as in an earlier age the DCCD frustrated state efforts—
presumably desired by their citizens—to limit the importation of 
alcohol, the DCCD could again frustrate state efforts to regulate the 
introduction of another intoxicant that could have deleterious effects 
on the health of its citizens. Even today, despite the Twenty-First 
Amendment’s apparent grant of plenary authority to states over 
alcohol, the Supreme Court held (wrongly, in my view) in 2005 that 
the DCCD forbade efforts by states to grant an advantage to in-state 
wineries who sought to ship directly to consumers.125 Moreover, the 
DCCD can also frustrate efforts of states to limit the spillover effects 
from their more liberal regime—efforts on which federal forbearance 
apparently hinges, according to the DOJ’s memo.  
As I have written elsewhere, Colorado’s differentiation can be 
defended against a DCCD challenge.126 I suspect that many of the 
arguments I made in favor of Colorado’s law could be deployed to 
defend other allegedly discriminatory marijuana laws. That said, I 
confidently predicted, prior to the Court’s Granholm case, that the 
DCCD would not be held to qualify states’ power over alcohol conferred 
by Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.127 The point is that you 
never know what arguments will find favor with judges. Even if they 
win, moreover, states will have had to go to the trouble and expense of 
 
125. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
126. Denning, supra note 9, at 2283–99. 
127. Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The 
Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-first Amendment, and State 
Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 Const. Comment. 297, 298 
(2002) (“The plain text of that section suggests that these recent [lower] 
court decisions are mistaken.”). 
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defending these laws against legal challenge. Money spent on litigation, 
further, will not be available to pay inspectors and regulators tasked 
with superintending a state’s legalization regime. 
Though it will likely play much less of a role, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV imposes a rule of substantial equality 
on states’ treatment of nonresidents. There are important qualifications 
that limit its reach—it does not cover corporations, for example, and it 
only protects nonresidents in the exercise of “fundamental rights”128—
but there is an argument regarding access of nonresidents to health care 
services.129 This might have implications at some point in the future for 
those entering a compassionate use state seeking medical marijuana.130 
The second lesson, however, is that the path to true experi-
mentation with different regulatory regimes, while preserving state 
choices not to participate in these experiments, is also suggested by the 
earlier tug-of-war between dry and wet states. Congress could (though 
this is unlikely) propose a Twenty-Eighth Amendment for marijuana, 
which, as does the Twenty-First, constitutionalizes significant state 
autonomy in its regulation. Second, Congress could explore creating a 
Webb-Kenyon-like law for marijuana. Both are explored in the next 
section. 
III. Toward a Constructive Federal Role 
The notion of a Twenty-Eighth Amendment addressing legalization 
and regulation of marijuana may seem fanciful. The polling numbers 
for legalization do not suggest the kind of consensus necessary to garner 
a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress, much less to receive the 
votes of three-quarters of the state legislatures necessary to ratify.131 
However, it is worth brief consideration. Though there was considerable 
dissatisfaction with Prohibition, there was similar consensus that a  
128. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 393–404 (2003) (discussing the limits to 
the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV). 
129. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (invalidating state law prohibiting 
nonresidents from obtaining abortions in the state). 
130. Denning, supra note 9, at 2286–87. But first marijuana would have to be 
rescheduled. Schedule I drugs are deemed to have no acceptable medical 
use. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 
489–90 (2001) (noting that Schedule I’s lone exception is for “Govern-
ment-approved research projects”). 
131. On the other hand, as was true with the Twenty-First Amendment, my 
hypothetical Twenty-Eighth Amendment, were it ever proposed, might 
be a good candidate for ratification by special ratifying conventions. See 
U.S. Const. art. V (permitting Congress to select the mode of ratifi-
cation). 
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return to the status quo ante—to the days of the hated saloon—was 
equally undesirable. In addition, supporters of repeal wanted to 
constitutionalize state control over importation and sale of alcohol. The 
fear was that either Congress or the Supreme Court might repeal or 
invalidate Webb-Kenyon; only by writing that control into any repeal 
amendment could states be assured of a measure of control over the 
alcohol trade. 
The original draft of what became the Twenty-First Amendment 
contained a section permitting concurrent federal regulation of alco-
hol.132 Supporters of “Section Three” maintained that concurrent federal 
power was necessary to prevent a return of the saloon.133 Opponents 
pointed out that Section Three could easily be construed to take back 
the measure of state power granted elsewhere in the amendment. If 
federal and state rules conflicted, opponents noted, it was not at all 
clear that the state rules would have precedence—that the federal rules 
would not be interpreted as a regulatory ceiling, rather than a mere 
floor.134 The resulting debate over Section Three brought a clarity to 
the issue of state versus federal power, and, in the end, the Senate’s 
“insistence on an unambiguous grant of power over liquor to the states 
overcame [Senators’] professed horror at the prospect of the saloon’s 
return . . . .”135 
What is instructive about the debate over the Twenty-First 
Amendment, and relevant to the current debate, is how the process 
allowed for political consensus to coalesce on the question of state 
control. The rejection of Section Three was an emphatic statement in 
favor of state control and a rejection of federal interference with state 
prerogatives. The subsequent debate—to the extent records exist—
confirm that those called upon to ratify the Amendment understood it 
in those terms.136 While the precise contours of the Twenty-First 
Amendment would be marked out over time by the Supreme Court, 
Section Two meant that the presumption with alcohol regulation would 
initially favor the states. 
Perhaps, then, we should not dismiss a constitutional amendment 
on marijuana too lightly. The Twenty-First Amendment was the pro-
duct of dissatisfaction with a proscriptive legal regime that had turned 
otherwise law-abiding citizens into criminals and empowered and 
enriched vast criminal enterprises. Widespread noncompliance under-
mined the rule of law; official efforts to coerce compliance arguably 
produced concomitant infringements on citizens’ civil liberties. The 
 
132. Denning, supra note 127, at 303–05. 
133. Id. at 303. 
134. Id. at 305–07. 
135. Id. at 307. 
136. Id. at 308. 
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state of affairs on the eve of the Twenty-First Amendment, then, bears 
some resemblance to the consequences of our decades-long War on 
Drugs. 
A constitutional amendment legalizing marijuana and delineating 
the responsibility for its regulation might serve as a vehicle for a wide-
ranging national debate on drug policy that the country has probably 
never properly had. If a pot amendment seems unlikely, one might 
reflect on how unlikely it would have seemed ten or twenty years ago 
that the DOJ would issue a memo setting terms on which it would 
refrain from enforcing the CSA in states that opted for legalization. 
If an amendment is likely not in the offing, the second-best outcome 
for state experimentation would be legislation that (1) clarified the legal 
status of state decriminalization or compassionate use laws under the 
CSA and (2) permitted states to regulate marijuana free from the 
strictures of the DCCD. Something like the Wilson or Webb-Kenyon 
Acts, in other words. 
The current situation cannot hold. The DOJ’s memorandum is 
worth the paper it’s written on. While it might provide some security 
to individuals who possess or produce marijuana for personal use, it 
provides precious little security for businesses that are incurring start-
up costs to establish dispensaries, obtain insurance, and, crucially, make 
use of the banking system. Anecdotes abound of the measures 
dispensaries are taking to handle the vast amounts of cash many bring 
in each month; one of the largest costs many dispensaries incur each 
month is security. Some form of legalization or decriminalization is a 
fact in a number of states. At the very least, Congress should consider 
amending the CSA to bless legalization where it exists—perhaps seeing 
what problems emerge as a result, if any. Or Congress could permit 
other states to “opt out” of the CSA by legalizing marijuana and 
agreeing to adopt a regulatory scheme for its production, possession, 
and consumption in the state. 
In addition, Congress could disable the DCCD when it comes to 
state regulation of marijuana. States should be able to legalize for their 
own citizens without necessarily embracing “pot tourism.” Even if they 
do not prohibit nonresident purchase, states should be able to take 
steps—as Colorado has done—that attempt to reduce spillover effects 
and respect the policy choices made by their neighbors, either as a 
matter of comity or to reduce the risk the feds will abandon their 
limited laissez-faire attitude and strangle experimentation in its crib. 
Limiting the reach of the DCCD would also enable states to, for 
example, require state residency for licensees, prohibit out-of-state 
ownership of dispensaries, and other measures that could ensure greater 
state and local accountability for those engaged in the sale of 
marijuana. 
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IV. Conclusion 
As the suit by Nebraska and Oklahoma has demonstrated, the path 
toward widespread legalization of marijuana is not a clear one. The 
tentative, equivocal attitude of the federal government toward state 
experimentation is aggravating the situation. I have argued here that 
state experiments with legalization will continue to occupy a legal 
twilight zone: at the mercy of federal enforcement priorities, which 
could change with a new administration, and vulnerable to legal 
challenges from neighboring states less eager to be a part of this new 
“greening” of America.137 I further argue that the nation’s experience 
with balancing the rights of wet and dry states in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries furnishes a template for constructive 
legislative action on Congress’s part. Congress should exercise some of 
the power available to it to establish vertical federalism boundaries in 
order to allow states to better manage the horizontal federalism 
challenges occasioned by legalization and compassionate use regimes. 
 
 
137. Cf. Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (1970). 
